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LIBERTY FOR SECURITY 
 
On 11 September 2001, we collectively endured the worst tragedy to 
touch American soil since the Civil War.  In the wake of this horrible 
event, a national hysteria erupted.  People are anxious to restore the lost 
security; but at what cost?  Many Americans seem not to care about the 
costs, and national polls show that now, more than ever, Americans are 
willing to trade their precious civil liberties in an attempt to restore 
security.  As the ACLU has stated these are difficult days.  Not only are 
they difficult, they will define the future of America. This iBrief explores 
the reactions of the American government to this tragedy and the effect 
these reactions will have on the freedom of all Americans.   
 
Introduction 
On 11 September 2001, we collectively endured the worst tragedy to touch American soil 
since the Civil War.  In one day America lost a number of innocent, civilian lives equal to one-
eighth of the number of American military casualties in Vietnam, a ten-year war.  America lost a 
symbol of its free-market, laissez-faire ideals, the World Trade Center.  We all lost the security 
that we had come to take for granted as Americans.  In the wake of this horrible event, a national 
hysteria erupted.  People are anxious to restore the lost security.  We can never resurrect the 
people we lost; we cannot easily recreate a monument to American dominance of the world 
economy like the World Trade Center.  Perhaps the only thing we can salvage is our security, but 
at what cost?  Many Americans seem not to care about the costs, and national polls show that 
now, more than ever, Americans are willing to trade their precious civil liberties in an attempt to 
restore security.  For that reason, the ACLU has labeled these “difficult days.”  Not only are they 
difficult, they will define the future of America.  What greater victory could the terrorists have 
sought than to fundamentally alter our way of life?  Are we willing to let them?   
Legislative Remedies 
American society encourages legislative action in response to a problem.  The question 
commentators always ask of our elected leaders is: “What are you going to do about [insert 
current issue of interest]?”  The attitude that our federal government, through our elected 
representatives, should be doing something about every major issue and every new problem has 
become a part of our psyche.  One must wonder if this is a healthy condition for a free society.  
One cannot blame politicians, though.  They must consider periodic reelection. A politician that 
returns to his district and informs his constituents that he has done absolutely nothing during his 
time in office quickly finds himself out of a job.  The strongest human instinct, self-preservation, 
encourages a profuse legislative response to any issue of public concern.    
It is doubtful one would find anybody suggesting that nothing should be done in response 
to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and that is certainly not the suggestion here.  One 
must consider, though, that lawmakers are under intense pressure to seem as though they are 
addressing important issues and problems through lawmaking.  Imagine the pressure they face 
now that there are an estimated 6,000-plus civilian casualties, the New York skyline is 
significantly diminished by the loss of an icon of American capitalism, and the vulnerability of 
the heart of our national defense organization has been exposed to the world.  The pressure on 
lawmakers to do something, anything, is compelling.  It is in this spirit that one should examine, 
with a careful eye, the legislation they enact. 
Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 
Two days after the tragedy, on Thursday, 13 September, the Senate passed an amendment 
to House appropriations bill H.R. 2500.1  Titled the “Combating Terrorism Act of 2001,” SA 
1562 contains various provisions in the spirit of combating terrorism.  Before one examines the 
provisions of SA 1562, one should consider the spirit in which it was passed.  The key 
consideration is the political fallout that would be faced by any legislator who opposed the 
Combating Terrorism Act of 2001.  Does a legislator’s opposition of the Combating Terrorism 
Act indicate that the legislator is opposed to combating terrorism?  Though it appears clear that 
such a claim is unjustified without further information, try to imagine the manner in which a 
political opponent might exploit (to the legislator’s detriment) such a vote.  It is probably obvious 
that, considering the hysteria surrounding terrorist acts, a vote against SA 1562 could easily end a 
politician’s career.   
The Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 contains sensible provisions like requiring an 
assessment report on the National Guard’s readiness to respond to terrorism (Sec. 812) and 
relaxing guidelines that previously hindered the recruitment of terrorist informants (Sec. 815).2  
There are more dubious sections of SA 1562, though.  On 19 September 2001, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) released an analysis of SA 1562.3  Perhaps the most important 
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observation contained in the analysis is that “the government does not need additional authority to 
investigate terrorism . . . [because] the current list of federal offenses that may support a wiretap 
order already includes virtually every felony that might be committed by terrorists.”4  This should 
raise questions in the minds of rational individuals.  If the government does not need to pass this 
legislation to accomplish the stated goals, then what are the true goals of the legislation?   
SA 1562 amends language in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, removing the following important 
language: “An investigation may not be initiated . . . based on activities protected by the First 
Amendment . . . including expressions of support or the provision of financial support for the 
nonviolent political, religious, philosophical, or ideological goals or beliefs of any person or 
group.”5  Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b), grants authority to law enforcement to employ roving 
wiretaps.6  A traditional wiretap may be placed on only a specific, designated telephone line 
while a roving wiretap authorizes the tapping of any telephone line from any location that an 
investigated individual uses.7  Combine the removal of restrictions prohibiting investigations 
based on one’s politics, religion, philosophy, or ideology with Title III authority to perform 
roving wiretaps and it is clear that SA 1562 grants the government almost unlimited power to 
track, record, and scrutinize citizens’ (perhaps we should begin referring to ourselves as subjects) 
phone conversations.  Wiretapping phone lines is not the only area in which SA 1562 expands the 
surveillance ability of law enforcement. 
The Combating Terrorism Act also amends the definition of pen/trap devices.  For a 
complete discussion of pen/trap devices, please consult our previous iBrief entitled “Carnivore: 
Will It Devour Your Privacy?”  SA 1562 significantly broadens the definition of a pen register.  
18 U.S.C. § 3127 defines a pen register as “a device which records or decodes electronic or other 
impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted.”8  The definition under SA 
1562 is expanded to include devices that record or decode “dialing, routing, addressing, or 
signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic 
communication is transmitted.”9  The important distinction between the issuance of a wiretap 
order and a pen/trap order is that a wiretap requires a showing of probable cause while a pen/trap 
order only requires the statement of a police officer that the information sought is “relevant to an 
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ongoing criminal investigation.”10  With the almost nonexistent standard of judicial review that is 
applied to applications for pen/trap orders, the result of the amendment is that law enforcement 
may monitor actual communication in the form of Internet “addressing information” such as 
URLs.  Because a URL contains much more specific information than a telephone number, the 
monitoring of URLs is necessarily content based (compare (800) 555 – 1234 with 
http://www.eff.org/sc/eff_wiretap_bill_analysis.html).   The same is true for terms entered into a 
search engine, which may also be treated as “addressing information.”11   
The Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 passed the Senate by voice vote.12  The opposition 
was either non-existent or so muted that there was no need for a more precise vote.  This is in 
spite of the Senator Leahy’s (D – VT) complaint that copies of SA 1562 were distributed a mere 
thirty minutes prior to the vote.  Senators are notorious for neglecting to read the bills and 
amendments they vote on, relying instead on a briefing by a lobbyist or an aide.  With the 
unusually hurried manner in which SA 1562 was brought to a vote, it seems unlikely that many, if 
any, of the Senators read the amendment prior to voting.  Again, who among them would be 
brave enough to vote against Combating Terrorism simply because they did not have the 
opportunity to consider the amendment?  In the words of President Bush, ostensibly directed to 
world leaders but also intended for domestic ears, “Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists.”13   
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 
On Wednesday 19 September 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft submitted a draft 
proposal for anti-terrorism legislation to Congress.  The stated purpose of the bill, submitted by 
Ashcroft, is “To combat terrorism and defend the Nation against terrorist acts, and for other 
purposes.”14  Similar in many respects to the wiretapping amendments passed as the Combating 
Terrorism Act of 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 is more extensive and more complete.  It 
has met with a storm of resistance from groups on all sides of the political spectrum.  The Justice 
Department was judicious enough to concurrently release a Section-By-Section Analysis of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001.  
                                                 
10 Privacy: Opposition to FBI Computer Surveillance Emerges After Vote , Nat’l J.’s Tech. Daily, 
Sept. 14, 2001, PM Edition, LEXIS, News Group File.   
11 Id. 
12 Summary, S. Amdt. 1562, 107th Cong. (2001), http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited October 2, 
2001).   
13 President George W. Bush, Text: Bush Address to Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
(last visited October 2, 2001). 
A detailed section-by-section analysis is beyond the scope of this iBrief; but the Justice 
Department’s Analysis is fair.15  Major sections of interest to cyber-criminologists fall under Title 
I (Intelligence Gathering) Subtitle A (Electronic Surveillance).  Section 101, Modification of 
Authorities Relating to Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices, performs essentially 
the same function as the pen/trap provisions of SA 1562, detailed above.  Section 101 allows the 
government to apply for a pen/trap order that is valid in any jurisdiction in the nation.  The law as 
it exists now requires an application for each jurisdiction in which authorities want to employ a 
pen/trap device.  Section 101, like SA 1562, expands the applicability of pen/trap orders and 
devices to include Internet communications and also to include the tracking of content-based 
addressing and routing information.  Section 101 allows law enforcement to engage in forum 
shopping, seeking a sympathetic judge whose pen/trap orders are valid in any jurisdiction. 
Section 102, Seizure of Voice Mail Messages Pursuant to Warrants, reduces the burden 
law enforcement faces when seizing stored voice messages.  Currently, the seizure of voice mail 
messages requires a Title III wiretap order.  Section 102 would reduce the burden for examining 
voice mail messages to a simple search warrant.  In essence it alters the classification of stored 
voice communication, placing it a level below live voice communication in terms of the burden 
law enforcement must meet to intercept or seize it.  
Section 105, Use of Wiretap Information From Foreign Governments, removes Fourth 
Amendment protection from the communications of American citizens collected by foreign 
governments, as long as they were collected “without the knowing participation of any officer or 
employee of the United States or person acting at the direction thereof.”16  Under Section 105, 
information collected in wiretaps put in place by foreign governments that violate the Fourth 
Amendment can be used in a criminal prosecution in the United States against a U.S. citizen.    
Currently the government can use a subpoena to compel information from an ISP such as 
a customer’s name, address and length of service.  Section 107, Scope of Subpoenas for Records 
of Electronic Communications, would further allow the collection of personal financial 
information such as credit card numbers with a subpoena.  Currently, law enforcement must 
secure a court order to gain access to personal financial data.  
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Section 108, Nationwide Service of Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence, performs 
much the same function as the jurisdictional aspects of Section 101, only with respect to e-mail.  
Law enforcement must currently secure a search warrant in the district where the e-mail storage 
servers are located in order to compel the production of unopened e-mail.  Section 108 would 
remove this hurdle and allow a search warrant issued in any district to apply to unopened e-mail 
stored in any district.  
Section 110, Emergency Disclosure of Electronic Communications, has a two-fold effect 
on the law as it relates to ISPs.  First, Section 101 authorizes the disclosure of electronic 
communications by an ISP if it reasonably believes that there is an immediate danger of death or 
serious physical injury to any person.  Currently ISPs may disclose the contents of a customer’s 
communications but not the customer’s non-content records, such as login records, in order for 
the ISP to protect its rights or property.  Section 110 erases this boundary, allowing the ISP to 
voluntarily disclose both content and non-content based customer records and communications in 
order to protects its rights or property.  
In evaluating the rela tive attractiveness of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), it is important 
to realize that law enforcement officials have been seeking these powers for years.  Until now, the 
political climate has been unfriendly to power grabs of the nature of the ATA.  The discussion of 
patriotism and political survival that applied to SA 1562 also applies to the ATA.  Again, which 
politicians are brave enough to vote against an Anti-Terrorism Act?  They face the risk of forever 
stigmatizing themselves as pro-terrorism.   
To simplify exactly what is being proposed, Ashcroft is asking for Congress to lower the 
burden for the use of intrusive surveillance devices.  Currently, law enforcement officials must 
make a showing of probable cause of a crime in order to intrude into and conduct searches of 
someone’s car or home.  If the ATA passes Congress in its current form, the bar will be 
significantly lowered, and law enforcement will simply have to assert that a suspect is likely to be 
engaged in terrorist activity to obtain permission to engage in the surveillance.17   
The ACLU came out in opposition to the ATA the day after it was introduced.  The 
ACLU points out that, though the bill is names the Anti-Terrorism Act, the reduction in burdens 
faced by law enforcement to secure surveillance orders will be apply to every American, not just 
terrorists.  Possibly the most disturbing result of the ATA, from the ACLU’s perspective, is the 
minimization of the role judges play in judicial oversight of law enforcement activities.  The level 
of judicial oversight will be reduced from probable cause to a mandated grant of the surveillance 
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order by a judge upon receipt of certification from a law enforcement officer that the information 
to be obtained is “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”18  The ATA would also expand 
the use of Carnivore by relaxing and expanding the standards for employing pen/trap devices.19  
According to the Center for Democracy & Technology, the ATA would do little to 
improve the ability of law enforcement to utilize surveillance and instead simply weaken the 
process of judicial review.  The prospect of diminishing judicial review, perhaps the only true 
check on law enforcement’s power, has brought groups of diverse interests together in opposition 
to the ATA.  On 20 September 2001, at the National Press Club in Washington, more than 150 
groups, from the ACLU to Gun Owners of America, the National Black Police Association to the 
National Lawyers Guild to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, expressed their support for 
a declaration entitled “In Defense of Freedom.”  Among the group were more than 300 law 
professors, and 40 computer scientists.  The ten-point declaration urges caution, point number six 
being perhaps most poignant: “We should resist the temptation to enact proposals in the mistaken 
belief that anything that may be called anti-terrorist will necessarily provide greater security.”20   
Conclusion 
John Ashcroft testified before the House Judiciary Committee on Monday, 24 September 
2001.  He urged immediate action and scoffed at the idea of including a sunset provision, saying, 
"If I thought the risk of terrorism was going to sunset in several years, I would be glad to say we 
ought to have a sunset provision.”21  Lawmakers scoffed at Ashcroft’s inability to explain the 
faults they find in the ATA and his “inability to say that such measures could have prevented the 
Sept. 11 attacks.”22  Because of these deficiencies in Ashcroft’s testimony, the committee was 
“unwilling to sign on to what appears to be one of the DOJ’s old laundry lists.”23   
It seems appropriate to conclude with a charge for all of those who would call themselves 
lovers of America, lovers of freedom, patriots:  
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During this time of intense pressure to act first and consider the 
consequences later, we must give our utmost respect and patience to 
those legislators who are courageous enough to place the sanctity of our 
civil liberties above their self-interest and above the national hysteria.   
       Author: Morgan Streetman 
 
 
